Public Mood In Russia Today

by Slava Tsukerman and Nina Kerova

On November 12, 2025, the Russian newspaper Vechernyaya Moskva (Evening Moscow) published an article by Ivan Okhlobystin, the well-known Russian actor, director, screenwriter, writer, TV host, and at the same time a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church and passionate supporter of Putin’s policies.

Okhlobystin wrote:
“I have always soberly understood that Russia will defeat the entire world, and that this would not happen with the snap of a finger. That this victory would be preceded by a dark era of disasters and cataclysms. There is no guarantee that I will survive it and attend the celebrations of triumph. But that does not change the situation. Today, in one way or another, roughly 12 million Russians are taking part in the Special Military Operation in Ukraine. And nothing is over yet. Imagine the potential power of that. A nuclear reactor! Our society will cleanse itself of the remnants of infantile nihilism and consumerist attitudes. We will become purer and, consequently, stronger.”

Okhlobystin’s optimism regarding the supposedly positive influence of participants in the war with Ukraine on Russian morale is not shared by many.
Here is an excerpt from an article published by the online newspaper The Moscow Times:

“Over three years of the war in Ukraine, Russian military personnel involved in the invasion who have returned to civilian life have killed and maimed more than 750 civilians. At least 378 people died, and in another 376 cases, people received life-threatening injuries.

“The geography of the crimes spans almost all of Russia—80 regions of the Russian Federation, the annexed Crimea and Sevastopol, as well as the unrecognized South Ossetia. Most often, ‘Special Military Operation veterans’ attack their relatives and acquaintances. The majority of the crimes are domestic in nature and occur in situations involving alcohol abuse.

“Of at least 334 fatal crimes over three years, participants in the war in Ukraine committed 166 murders (Article 105 of the Criminal Code), resulting in 196 dead. The second most deadly crime—infliction of grievous bodily harm (Article 111)—accounted for 112 cases (and 112 dead). Fifty-five Russians died in 43 veteran’s traffic violations (Article 264), and another 12 died in 10 cases of negligent homicide (Article 109). Two minors died due to coercion into drug use (Article 230), and one killing occurred in connection with exceeding the limits of necessary self-defense (Article 108).

“Overall, the most common crime resulting in deaths and serious injuries was intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm. Those returning from the war committed at least 356 such attacks. As a result, in addition to the 112 dead, at least 251 seriously injured victims were recorded, including those left disabled.

“Another 63 survivors suffered severe injuries during attempted murders. The real number of such crimes is much higher, since courts do not publish all decisions.

“Participation in the invasion of Ukraine in the vast majority of cases mitigates the sentences of those returning from the front. Only in 24 of 547 examined court rulings did judges not consider participation in combat as a mitigating factor. Punishments are also reduced for ‘state awards’, ‘wounds’, ‘veteran combat status’, ‘participation in the defense of the Fatherland’, ‘participation in the activities of the Russian Armed Forces’, and similar grounds.”

Here is the description of one of the “veteran murders,” published by the website Verstka:

“In December 2023, war participant Viktor Chugunov was driving around with an 18-year-old Kristina, acquaintance of his and a friend of his girlfriend. The young people were trying to deliver food to Kristina’s boyfriend in a pre-trial detention center, but the package was not yet accepted because of the brake time in the center.

“While they were talking in the car, Chugunov recalled that the detained man had earlier made advances toward his girlfriend. Kristina confirmed this and claimed that she and her boyfriend ‘wanted to lure Chugunov’s girlfriend into a threesome’. Chugunov didn’t like this, and he reprimanded the girl. But she didn’t calm down and continued her ‘sex-related conversation’. Chugunov got angry and, to make her ‘shut up’, looped a seat belt around her neck and strangled her.

“Afterward, Chugunov pulled the body out of the car, dragged it into a snowdrift, and walked home. That evening, he returned to the crime scene, slung the body over his shoulders, carried it toward the city garages, and dumped it in a ditch.”

During the war with Ukraine, political repression in Russia continues to intensify.

Below are excerpts from the latest report by the Memorial Society, “memorial2025rus.pdf,” which has been declared illegal in Russia:

“According to the database maintained by the project ‘Support for Political Prisoners. Memorial’, at the end of 2024 there was information on 2,834 people. This list includes both individuals already recognized as political prisoners and those whose imprisonment shows clear signs of political motivation and illegality — but even this is far from the full number of those affected by repression.

“Case materials are, in many instances, classified, and it is impossible to trust confessions that were most likely obtained under torture, just as it is impossible to trust the Russian investigative system and courts.

“Since the beginning of the full-scale war, at least 792 people have been criminally prosecuted for treason, espionage, and confidential cooperation with foreigners. No fewer than 359 of them were sentenced under these articles in 2024 alone. Mostly, we know nothing about their cases, where they were political or just criminal, but even so, there are compelling grounds to assume political motives and illegality.

“In summary, we can say that the total number of people whose imprisonment has clear signs of political motivation in Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine reached at least 10,000 in 2024.”

Here are two examples illustrating the nature of most accusations:

On June 26, 2025, the Perm Regional Court sentenced 35-year-old photographer Grigory Skvortsov from Perm to 16 years in a maximum-security colony on charges of treason.

He was found guilty of giving an American journalist diagrams containing information about the location of special facilities. Skvortsov had obtained these diagrams from a book “Soviet ‘Secret Bunkers’: Urban Special Fortifications of the 1930s–1960s.” For a long time, this book was sold completely legally by major Russian online retailers such as Avito and Ozon.

Another example: St. Petersburg artist Sasha Skochilenko was sentenced to seven years in prison for posting anti-war slogans on price tags in a supermarket. This case was shown in a short film, produced in USA, with most of the creative team and production crew consisting of new immigrants from Russia. This film can be watched on YouTube.

Well-known public figures—writers, journalists, actors, entertainers—risk losing their careers, and even facing prosecution, if they do not publish statements similar to those of Okhlobystin quoted at the beginning of this article. Any condemnation of the war is treated as a crime. Dozens of formerly popular stars have left Russia.

Wikipedia reports:

“Emigration from Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is the largest wave of emigration from the country since the collapse of the USSR. It stems from a combination of factors: political persecution of activists, politicians, and journalists; concern for personal safety during wartime; disagreement with the authorities’ actions; and expectations of major deterioration in Russia’s economic and humanitarian situation.

“According to various estimates, from 500,000 to 1.3 million people left Russia in the first year after the invasion.”

It is clear that today official Russian statistics do not publish data that would reflect negatively on public sentiment in the country. Yet even the data that is released speaks volumes.

“Over 25 years of Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russian citizens’ demand for a ‘strong leader’ and a ‘strong state’ has declined severalfold. This is according to the results of a survey conducted by the state-run All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTSIOM), published on Tuesday, September 23, 2025.

While in 2000, 72% of Russians said that the country most needed a “strong leader,” in 2025, only 28% of respondents said so. The same 28% said today that Russia needed a “strong state” – in 2000, their share was 59%.

The demand for a “strong hand” that emerged in Russia in the 1990s “apparently has been addressed,” state sociologists commented on these results.

Among the priorities for Russia, the largest number of respondents (31%) named “the revival of culture and spirituality”— 25 years ago, 27%. “The revival of patriotism” was considered important by 29% of respondents (27% in 2000), and “the revival of traditions” by 22% (14% in 2000). Democratic institutions of government were considered a priority by 17% (versus 14% 25 years ago), and the national idea by 16% (14% 25 years ago).
Russians born after 2001 and younger millennials were the most likely to name democratic institutions of government as important—27% and 29%, respectively. Among older Russians, this figure does not exceed 16%.

“Democratic values ​​and a national idea remain niche rather than widespread demands,” noted VTSIOM head Valery Fyodorov.